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Remarks About Targeted Killing 
in the Light of Public International Law
Current events on the world political scene lead us to consider how in-
ternational law should currently realize its goals. It should be taken into 
account that, apart from striving to maintain international security and 
peace by creating rules of cooperation between states, international law 
should also address the use of various forms and methods of force in 
international relations. The purpose of the latter is to create regulations 
defining the behavior of states under international law and aimed at en-
suring international order in the world. This is important due to the fact 
that while in the sphere of domestic solutions the monopoly of state 
institutions on the use of force was developed, international law refers 
to this issue as an effect of the fact that it has no special instruments that 
would not only regulate the use of force, but would also minimize the 
effects of its use.
Currently, we use the term “use of force” when referring to a situa-
tion in which violence is used in a manner close to the technical char-
acteristics of the state of war, as well as to military operations that do not 
encounter armed resistance.
Without going into more detailed considerations regarding the es-
sence of force, it should be defined as a directed power, in the sense 
of being turned or used against someone or something. International 
law regulations concerning its application, not having the character of 
norms of the value of iuris cogentis, accept that force may be resorted 
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to. However, while its application by UN states and armed forces is, in 
principle, obvious, controversy arises from  non-state participants of 
the international community resorting to it, through the use of cyber 
resources and hybrid attacks, against which most countries are basi-
cally unprepared.
Can these non-classical ways be compared with the use of armed 
force? Considering the effects, sometimes comparable to the effect of 
the classic use of military force, an affirmative answer should not be ex-
cluded. This is all the more important when it is taken into account that 
a victim of assault is defined under international law, but the perpetrator is 
not clearly defined, which means that the latter may not always be a state.
Therefore, international law must adapt to the existing reality, while 
striving to recognize the legitimacy of the use of force, often without 
anyone’s consent, despite the possibility of questioning the legality 
of such actions. Is this a solution to the problem?
Certainly not, because, for example, events in Ukraine, in particular 
in Crimea, in Syria, or during the fights against the so-called Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), reveal that the thesis of the twilight of 
power as an instrument of politics cannot be defended. On the one hand, 
to ensure its own security and to defend the international order based 
on values, not just interests, the role of international law should be em-
phasized, and, on the other – if it is to be effective, situations justifying 
recourse to force should be defined.
Therefore, clarifying the situation related to the use of force in the 
context of new threats is a significant challenge to international law, and 
one which it must face, otherwise the existing political and economic 
system will be shaken, and as a consequence the values constituting the 
basis of international order will be abandoned.
The issue is also important due to the fact that the territory of one state 
is made available in different forms for operations conducted against 
another state, which is often associated with undertaking preventive 
armed operations against another state or non-state actors (e.g. against 
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the so-called Islamic state). It may also be associated with the so-called 
deliberate killing of specific persons responsible for planning or per-
forming terrorist acts in another country, but not against it1, which in the 
international legal sphere is referred to as targeted killing.2 This raises 
numerous doubts, recently particularly emphasized in connection with 
the order of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, to con-
duct on 3 January 2020 with the help of an unmanned aerial vehicle, 
i.e. a drone, an air raid on an airport in Baghdad (Iraq), which was aimed 
at killing the Iranian general Kasem Suleimani – commander of the Ira-
nian branch of Ghods.3
This event raised the basic question: was the action of the American 
state authorities in accordance with applicable international law, specifi-
cally with the right to self-defense functioning in the sphere of interna-
tional law, guaranteed by both common law and art. 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations?
In reply, it should be stated that, although the contemporary frame-
work for the admissibility of recourse to self-defense is set by the UN 
Charter, which states in art. 51 that “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual […] self-defence […], until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security”4, this law as an inherent right is recognized by all le-
gal systems in accordance with the principle that vim vi repellere omnia 
iura permittunt (all laws allow force to be resisted with force).
Nevertheless, the question arises of whether this means that in in-
ternational law there exists a law that stands above the provisions of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which refer only to the situation involving 
the occurrence of an armed attack? In answering this question, reference 
should be made to the 1986 Nicaragua ruling, in which the International 
1 J. Kranz, Zakaz użycia siły in: Wielka Encyklopedia Prawa, Prawo międzynarodowe pub-
liczne, ed. J. Symonides, D. Pyć, Warszawa 2014, vol. IV, p. 578.
2 Ibidem, p. 578.
3 J. Bielecki, Trump wyczuł Irańczyków,  “Rzeczpospolita” 13 January 2020.
4 Journal of Laws of 1947, no. 23, item 90.
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Court of Justice stated, inter alia, that the right to self-defense, which 
is by its very nature associated with the use of armed force, is a natural 
right vested in every state both on the basis of common law and the 
provisions of the UN Charter.5 However, in order for a state to refer 
to this right as a part of self-defense, it must be able to prove that it 
has been the victim of an armed assault. Therefore, the burden of proof 
falls on such a state, which can sometimes be difficult to establish, es-
pecially when there are various types of non-state formations behind 
the armed attack.6 And this is all the more important as the definition of 
armed assault is lacking, although when trying to define it, it should be 
stated that it is characterized by a larger or smaller scale of short-term 
or repeated armed attacks. Nevertheless, the legality of recourse to self-
defense is subject to control by the UN Security Council, which means 
that it appertains formally until the Security Council takes the measures 
and methods necessary to restore peace and security.
This statement is subject to dispute, because with regard to self-de-
fense all countries are free to act, including with the use of armed force, 
if the situation so requires, because, as emphasized in a separate opinion 
expressed by one of the ICJ judges in the judgment of this Tribunal in the 
abovementioned Nicaragua case – it is dangerous and unnecessary to 
strictly define the conditions of lawful self-defense, leaving a large area 
where armed response to violence is in fact prohibited and where there has 
also been no use of force by the United Nations to fill the gap.7 In many 
situations, it is difficult to determine the moment when an armed assault 
began, and thus establish that the requirements of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and thus the conditions for the use of force in self-defense were 
met. For example, do attacks by various armed associations against for-
5 “International Court of Justice Reports” 1986, pp. 543–544; 76 “International Court of Jus-
tice Reports” 1986, p. 349 and 428.
6 J. Kranz, Zakaz użycia siły, p. 577.
7 “International Court of Justice Reports” 1986. See MTS advisory opinion: Legalność 
użycia broni nuklearnej ICJ, Reports, 1996, p. 226 and 246. Y. Dinstein, Conduct of Hos-
tilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge 2004, p. 220 and next.
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eign diplomatic or consular representations constitute an armed assault 
justifying self-defense by the state whose representation suffered damage?
The United States takes the view that the response to the use of 
armed force in such a situation is in accordance with Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, in which case the right to self-defense is exercised.8 A similar 
approach can also be seen in Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), 
in which it was recognized that particularly hostile actions of non-state 
actors could be treated as synonymous with assault, thus justifying the 
exercise of the victim’s right to self-defense.9
In relation to the killing of the Iranian general, a number of ques-
tions arise, such as whether the US recourse to self-defense was justified 
by the fact that the country considered itself to have suffered harm, or 
whether there were there other arguments justifying US actions.
When analyzing US actions, it should be taken into account that 
the action against the Iranian general was performed without the con-
sultation and consent of the Iraqi authorities, otherwise the problem of 
Iraq’s joint responsibility would have arisen, as the Iraqi authorities had 
received the official representative of the foreign army on their territory, 
who had come to Iraq on an official visit aimed at representing Iran in 
talks with the Iraqi government.
In answer to these questions, it should be noted that the basis / source 
of the incident at Baghdad airport are the conflicting political and mili-
tary interests of Iran and the United States. The former country is seek-
ing to become a Middle Eastern hegemon and holds that actions re-
lated to the United States and its presence in the Middle East should be 
countered and combated. On the other hand, the US assumes that the ac-
tions taken by the Iranian authorities in the political and military sphere 
significantly contribute to the violation of American interests in this part 
of the world, especially when it comes to the freedom of navigation in 
8 M.N. Shaw, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne, Warszawa 2011, p. 696; see also: Con-
temporary Practice of the United States, “American Journal of International Law” 1999, 
vol. 93, p. 161.
9 M.N. Shaw, Prawo międzynarodowe…, p. 698.
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the Persian Gulf, whose waters transport more than a quarter of the oil 
extracted. Thus, in response to the damage caused mainly by the Iranian 
troops of Ghods, recognized as a terrorist formation because of their 
means and methods of action, it was decided that in this situation pre-
emptive self-defense actions should be taken in Iraqi territory, where 
according to the intelligence information, General K. Sulejmani would 
be staying, dictated by the need to thwart the Iranian attack or a series of 
such attacks against the US and its property.10 
The question of the legitimacy of this type of action is emerging here.
In response, it should be stated that it does not contradict the essence 
of art. 51 of the UN Charter11, while the assessment of demonstrating 
the lack of other options and taking into account the criteria of imme-
diacy, necessity and proportionality raises a question.
Referring, inter alia, to the already cited ruling of the International 
Court of Justice of 1986 in the Nicaragua case, it should be noted that 
the ICJ clearly acknowledges that changing the premises and objectives, 
as well as the methods and means, of fighting with the use of the armed 
force, leads to the emergence of new concepts. These, in the event of 
extraordinary circumstances, are intended to justify the use of unilat-
eral military measures without the consent of the UN Security Coun-
cil. This represents, to a certain extent, a departure from the essence of 
the Declaration of principles of international law concerning friendly 
relations and the cooperation of states in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter of 24 October 1970, in which it is stated, in the part 
relating to the prohibition of the use of force, that each country has the 
10 Quotation for: <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2049534/
Statement-by-the-department-of-defense/>.
11 See the report of a group of experts appointed by the UN Secretary General: A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004, point 188; Report of the UN Secretary General: 
In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Right for All: 2005, point 
124; H. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, “166 Hague Academy of 
International Law. Recueil des Cours” 1980, pp. 231–237.
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obligation to refrain from organizing in another country activities aimed 
at committing acts involving the use of or threat to use force.12
This is because in recent decades the conditions for referring to 
the use of force and actors on the political scene have changed. This re-
quires not only adaptation, but also interpretation of international legal 
norms in the context of new threats which necessitate, nolens volens, 
sometimes using unilateral means of removing an opponent without 
the consent of the UN Security Council, in the form of ‘targeted kill-
ing’, i.e. physical elimination, at the request of the government of the 
state and with the help of its organs, of specific persons responsible for 
the preparation of terrorist acts13 – in other words  acts of violence ir-
respective of the motives or intentions of the perpetrators, committed 
to perform criminal acts with the intention of causing a sense of threat to 
the safety of life, freedom or social stability, violation of territorial in-
tegrity, in order to force the government to act or desist from acting.
Intentional physical elimination is carried out on the territory of an-
other state without being directed precisely against it, usually in a situ-
ation where the other state is unable to ensure security and does not 
control the person preparing terrorist acts, or who participates in their 
implementation. In terms of the activities of General K. Sulejmani, these 
were directed against the United States, which in this situation justified 
his possibly quick and even necessary physical elimination, as direct 
capture of K. Sulejmani was unrealistic. It was assumed that such a pre-
cise attack directed against one person falls within the limits of both 
basic necessity and proportionality in relation to potential other victims, 
whose death could not have been avoided, including the Iraqi command-
er of the People’s Mobilization Force – the police force fighting on the 
Iraqi side with the so-called Islamic State (ISIS).
12 K. Kocot, K. Wolfke, Selection of documents for learning international law, Wrocław–
Warszawa 1976, pp. 524–533.
13 Cit. per: W. Czapliński, A. Wyrozumska, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. Zagadnienia 
systemowe, Warszawa 2004, pp. 696–698.
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Another example of intentional elimination was the killing of the 
Saudi Osama bin Laden, the leader of the terrorist organization Al-Qai-
da (Base) and the main organizer of the terrorist attack on the New York 
World Trade Center in September 2001, by a special American unit in 
May 2011 in Pakistan.14 
These remarks lead to conclusions of a more general nature, name-
ly that modern states, despite the existing legal regulations, are primar-
ily guided by the reason of state, which has primacy over human rights, as 
well as international legal regulations. In this regard, one can conclude that 
American actions in the Middle East are part of a broader deterrence strat-
egy not only for Iran, but also for other unnamed enemies of America.
However, looking through the prism of this event, it is a more po-
litical than a legal reflection to suggest that the President of the United 
States, who was at risk of impeachment, sought to show, during an im-
portant trial with Iran, that he was determined in to ensure the security 
of the country and its population.
Finally, there is also the issue of legal assessment of the event in ques-
tion, which should take the following into account: in order to be an ef-
fective guarantor of the existing international order, international law must 
take into account that, along with changing beliefs about its effectiveness, 
values also often change with interests. These are manifested in: strength 
that determines not only the power of the country, but also the goals and 
directions of the state’s activities in a way that often deviates from the 
established principles of the international order and a policy emphasiz-
ing security. This is a value that impacts international legal ventures and 
something that usually has far-reaching repercussions, pushing the legal 
boundaries of what is acceptable and imaginable, and therefore, in order 
for international law to be—to emphasize this once again—effective, it 
cannot be passive, let alone indifferent.
Hence, being in favor of acknowledging the effects of the case in 
question, it should be emphasized that, despite obvious controversies 
14 J. Kranz, Zakaz użycia siły, p. 578.
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regarding the use of force as part of pre-emptive defense, the result of 
which is, inter alia, the deliberate elimination of a specific person / per-
sons, this action should be considered legal, together with the require-
ment / criterion of necessity and proportionality, which in relation to the 
second requirement is not always observed or complied with.
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Remarks About Targeted Killing  
in the Light of Public International Law
The premises concerning the use of force are currently changing, as are the 
goals and methods, which entails that appropriate adaptation and interpre-
tation of international legal norms is required in the context of new threats 
and methods of combating them. This constitutes a significant problem, es-
pecially in the event of extraordinary circumstances that are to justify the 
use of unilateral measures without the consent of the UN Security Council.
This encompasses, inter alia, the issue of targeted killing, i.e. elimi-
nating in the territory of another state, while not operating against such 
a state, on the order of a specific government, a specific person respon-
sible for the illegal use of force, if other methods of apprehending the 
perpetrator are unrealistic. This makes such a method, in a given cir-
cumstance, a legal form of combat, as long as the criterion of necessity 
and proportionality is taken into account.
Keywords: international law, targeted killing, pre-emptive self-defense, 
necessity, proportionality, reason of state.
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